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 The idea of dialogicality in human experience is an
ancient one. A counterpoint to a scientiﬁc and epistemo
logical tendency to isolate the person from his environ
ment, it has recently stimulated a great abundance of work
(Gillespie, 2011). A dialogical approach can thus contribute
to a better understanding of the relational, social and cul
tural nature of the person. Yet such emphasis raises the
reverse question: if the person is constituted by and
through dialogues with the world, how can he or she
develop as unique being, how can she or he be accountable
for her own thinking and action? In this paper, using the
example of a young woman’s diary, I examine three di
mensions along which inner-dialogue might proceed
(temporal orientation, degree of generalization, and degree
of ﬁction) by which the person might generate her unique
voice. So doing, I wish to highlight the often forgotten
ethical underpinnings of dialogical studies. Before engaging
in current approaches and developing my own, I wil
therefore go back to an older dialogical reﬂection.l 
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, Prologue: the essence of dialogue
The Babylonian Talmud (the book discussing the lega
implications of the Torah, itself the “Old Testament”, 3rd– 
 5th centuries) teaches us how two Masters, known for thei
competing schools of thought, replied to a man asking fo
conversion – Shammai, known for his rightfulness, and
Hillel, praised for his goodness:
On another occasion it happened that a certain non-Jew
came before Shammai and said to him, “I will convert to
Judaism, on condition that you teach me the whole
Torah while I stand on one foot.” Shammai chased him
away with the builder’s tool that was in his hand. He
came before Hillel and said to him, “Convert me.” Hille
said to him, “What is hateful to you, do not to you
neighbor: that is the whole Torah; the rest is com
mentary; go and learn it.
Babylonian Talmud, tractate Shabbat 31a
There has been abundant commentary on this little
story but it is useful here in order to introduce a few idea
related to dialogicality. The ﬁrst is the centrality of the
relationship to other: to the man that wants to study a very
large tradition in a very short time (standing on one foot)
the core teaching is to think self-in-relationship to the
other (“what is hateful to you do not do to the other”). The
second is that the master asks the person to go and study
the Torah – and it is through this dialogue with the text
itself a compilation of centuries of rabbinic dialogues and
controversies, proposing various interpretations of the
biblical texts and arguing by pursuing a further dialogue
2with the text, that he might learn. Third, the basic query for 
learning from a knowing master has been redeﬁned as a 
situation in which the learner is conceived as a responsible 
and active person, meant to engage both with the memory 
of the master and with the text. Fourth, learning is meant 
to be done by an embodied person – it is the limit of the 
physical endurance that will frame the time devoted to 
study. In addition, the power of Hillel’s teaching is under-
lined by the presence of another person, Shammai – both 
representing their respective schools. Altogether, this 
might lead the man to be an ethical person (care for the 
other) and a knowledgeable one, who has the capacity to 
engage in inner and outer dialogue.
Discussions on dialogism rarely go back to these 
Talmudic times (with the notable exception of Billig, 1996; 
see also Zittoun, 2007). However there is in that sequence 
one of its core principles: the inherent dialogicality of 
humans, as an epistemic and ethical stance.
Four approaches to dialogicality
There have been recent important contributions to the 
clariﬁcation of existing dialogical studies (Grossen & 
Salazar Orvig, 2011; Linell, 2009; Marková, 2005; 
Rommetveit, 1992). Although it would not be useful to 
summarize what has been brilliantly done by others, I wish 
to clarify four approaches to dialogicality before intro-
ducing mine. Although some of these approaches have 
been developed quite independently from the others, they 
can also be – and often are – combined.
1) Dialogue as ontological, ethical prerequisite
Discussing the recent production of dialogical work, 
Markovà (2011) recalls that a series of foundational 
scholars for a dialogical approach, Bakhtin, Levinas, 
Gadamer and Ricoeur, developed the idea of dialogicality to 
overcome individualist ontologies:
Dialogical in this context does not mean that these 
scholars were primarily concerned with the self and 
dialogue as a face-to-face interaction, but that they thus 
posed fundamental questions about human and 
communicative resources of the self and others.
Markovà, 2011, p . 6 6
In effect, in this ontology, the person is considered as 
primarily in relationship to the other; the presence of the 
other, and the recognition of the uniqueness of the other, is 
a precondition for the humanity of the person as such. 
Whether it has a simply philosophical or a traditional 
religious background, as seen above, such a stance has a 
necessary ethical implication: the person is answerable in 
front of the Other (Buber, 2001; Lévinas, 1972).
This ontological position also has an epistemological 
implication, that “knowledge is jointly generated by the self 
and ‘others’ throughout history as well as through symbolic 
and dialogical encounters” (Markovà, 2011, p. 67). 
This ontological perspective, Linell proposes to call 
dialogicality (Linell, 2009, p 7).2) Dialogicality as epistemological stance
From the previous stance follows very naturally an idea 
that has been developed mostly during the last century: 
that of the social nature of human mind and the mutual 
construction of person and culture. Dialogism can thus be 
seen as a speciﬁc epistemological stance (Linell, 2009, p. 7), 
described in the following way by Marková, Linell, Grossen, 
and Salsazar Orvig (2007, p. 8):
Our point of departure is the perspective that humans 
live in the worlds of others’ words (Bakhtin 1989/1996,
p. 167). The limits of the self are not within the I, but
within the relationship with the other, ‘I and thou’. 
Every individual makes his/her world in terms of others 
by dialogically constructing and re-constructing the 
social world as a set of multifaceted and multivoiced 
realities situated in culture. Systems of symbols, texts, 
artistic products and historical interpretations, all have 
dialogical properties. They are expressions of socially 
shared dialogical cognitions and communicative ac-
tions. These are not engaged in a peaceful contempla-
tion but are in tension, they clash, judge and evaluate 
one anther.
This perspective has thus brought authors to thematize 
a self-other-object model to apprehend social situations 
(Markovà, 2005). Such a perspective is also adopted by 
social psychologists interested in the dynamics by which 
meaning circulates and evolve within the social world and 
through individuals (Moscovici, 1984), as well as by socio-
cultural or cultural psychologists (Boesch, 1991; Valsiner, 
2000, 2012) (for a similar point Gillespie and Cornish,
2010).
3) Forms of dialogues
One obvious way of approaching dialogicality is to look 
at actual conversations and interpersonal communication. 
Drawing on Bakthin’s work on literature (1982, 1984, 
1996), authors examine discourses with the ideas that (a) 
an ut-terance is always an answer to a previous utterance 
or anticipates a further one, and (b) words and utterances 
have speciﬁc genres, referring to various social frames and 
carrying the echoes and undertones of other uses, in past 
and present situations. Such ideas can lead to different 
forms of enquiry, ranging from a strict analysis of situations 
of communication to broader analysis of social dynamics. 
Even when it comes to examining actual interactive situa-
tions, it soon appears that various “dialogues” co-occur and 
are deeply interwoven. Grossen and Salazar Orvig (2011) 
and Zittoun and Grossen (2012) have thus identiﬁed: (1) 
Distant dialogues with absent third parties who are 
involved in these or other related situations (or “dialogues 
in absentia”, François, 2005); (2) Actual dialogues, o r dia-
logue in praesentia (François, 2005), with present others; 
(3) Autodialogue, the sort of dialogue that a person has with 
herself (Josephs & Valsiner, 1998). It also includes the di-
alogues one can have with internalized others, or Inner 
Alters (Marková, 2006). Typically, these dialogues also 
designate what could be called diverse aspects of the self as 
in Dialogical Self Theory (see below); (4) Dialogue between
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3situations: part of the sense of continuity of the self is due
to the similarities that exist between various situations in
which the person is involved, and the similar patterns o
motives of activities in which people are engaged and tha
repeat in different frames. Hence, the dialogue here des
ignates the person’s engagement within a speciﬁc type o
situation, which itself answers to other situations. Such
dialogues connect various spheres of experience, variou
temporalities (one in which the person is involved and one
that is invoked in his or her discourse), and consequently
various facets of one’s own self. (5) Dialogue between
human and non-human actants. Cultural elements also play
a role in the construction, transformation, and manage
ment of the self. Yet these are “non-human
actants” (Latour, 1987): they have speciﬁc modes o
intervening in dialogue and can play an important role in
the person’s learning and development.
Eventually, these various forms of dialogue interac
with each other and create dialogical tensions (Zittoun &
Grossen, 2012). Under some conditions, such inne
tensions might bring the person to reﬂect or to ﬁnd new
creative solutions that might yield new ideas and actions
Of course, people might also want to reduce tensions by
repressing some voices or complying with others.
4) Dialogical self theory
With a speciﬁc emphasis on inner dialogues, since the
90’s Hermans developed his dialogical self model (or DST
for Dialogical Self Theory), which has the virtue of recog
nizing the dialogical nature of the self, against a too
monological view of the person. Developed as a clinica
technique, it enabled many scholars to identify “a multi
plicity of I-positions within the imaginary landscape of the
self” (Hermans & Kempen, 1996). Heuristically useful in
identifying positional shifts, the model has been enriched
over the years. However, as with any popular method, i
runs the risk of losing sight of its very constitution as a
mediation tool. One of the limits I want to address here i
its identiﬁcation of ﬁrmly deﬁned I-positions through
speciﬁc discursive practices, usually research interviews o
psychotherapeutic dialogue aiming at identifying these po
sitions (Jasper, Moore, Whittaker, & Gillespie, 2012).1
In recent studies, authors have tended to identify I-po
sitions as quasi “characters” (Hermans & Gieser, 2012, pp
2–3, pp. 1–22) to be found in a person’s narratives, as wel
as “third positions” (the resolution of conﬂicting positions)
meta-positions (that is, in a meta-cognitive posture), andr 
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1 Discussions of the model have addressed others shortcomings, such 
as the fact that it does not explicitly consider the social embeddedness of 
the self (Gillespie, Cornish, Aveling, & Zittoun, 2008), the social frames 
structuring interactions (Moore, Jaspers, Gillespie, 2011), the systems of 
activity in which people are embedded (Michel & Wortham, 2002), or 
their location in society (Jasper et al., 2012, p. 325) or culture (Valsiner & 
Han, 2008). Other authors have found the model too language-focussed, 
and have proposed expansions to non verbal experiences (Grossen and 
Salazar Orvig, 2011), or to embodied ones (Baerveldt, 2014; 
Maslov, 2011). In the terms proposed here, if the model accepts 
dialogicality as an ontological principle, it seems to fail to consider it 
as an epistemo-logical and ethical principle, and to account for the 
plurality of forms of dialogue.promoter positions –which have a guiding role (Hermans &
Gieser, 2012, pp. 15–16, pp. 1–22). While these distinction
might be useful to account for certain issues identiﬁed a
“identity related” –  in therapy, migration, etc. – one
should not forget, however, that they do not constitute a
full model of mind. It ought not be assumed because people
can speak as if they were one or the other character, o
identify inter-nalized voices of others in themselves, tha
people actually have characters in their mind
Consciousness is much more ﬂuid than this. As stream, i
has all kind of layers and movements, which are all fed
through or inserted in his-torical and cultural worlds – it i
dialogical (Baldwin, 1997; Gillespie & Cornish, 2010; James
1890). Some thoughts occur with no speciﬁc me-ness, and
yet are dialogical. A presentation in terms of I or me i
necessary only if one is called, for some reason, to self
deﬁne, to present oneself in terms of his or her belonging
or attributes, or position herself toward someone else, or to
react to some require-ment to position oneself (but for a
different position see Raggatt, 2014).
So called identity-positions are just one aspect of a
deeper, more general movement of the social mind
revealed by dialogical approaches. It is this dialogicality o
the ﬂow of consciousness that I try to approach here.
Dialogicality and semiotic answerability
Studying the person from a dialogical perspective
(recognizing dialogicality and dialogism) demands exam
ining how her activities and sense-making – actions
thoughts, and externalisation – reﬂect or are guided by the
social world, her past interactions with others, her expe
rience of places and locations, her exposure to social rep
resentations, ﬁlms and songs. In that sense, the
dialogicality of mind is much more than the speciﬁc dia
logue with internalized words of others, as the study o
semiotic mediation shows (Leiman, 2011; Valsiner, 2001
2007a, 2007b). In a similar vein, I suggest that the dialog
ical nature of mind is better apprehended at the level of a
smallest unit of analysis of mind: that of signs, things tha
designate other things (Peirce, 1993). Mind and human
action are enabled by semiotic mediation – resulting from
the internalisation, or “translation” of signs into mind
traces of past experiences and their combination and cre
ation into new syntheses (Freud, 2001; Valsiner, 2007a
Vygotsky, 1986). However, capturing the dialogicality o
mind is extremely difﬁcult: ﬁrst, because it can only be
accessed through externalization; and second, because i
signs are in themselves social, then any thought o
expression is in an ever-lasting movement of dialogue
How can we know, from a person’s externalization, wha
she is thinking? How can we trace back to the person sign
or words which are more clearly quotations
ventrilocations, or appropriations?
One of the ways to approach the stream of thinking
speech is to decide on some entities that can be recogni
able as such – as borrowed from somewhere else, anoth
situation, another person’s discourse, other ideas and sign
Typically, a turn-to-turn analysis of dialogue reveals suc
effects. Hence, another way to observe dialogicality is 
identify “markers” in one’s discourse, or “beacons” –
4objects that, so to say, subsist or ﬂoat in the ﬂow of 
thinking or discourse. Socially shared objects are such 
beacons: for example, mentions of cultural elements such as 
books or movies, political or shared events, can appear in 
one’s discourse, and be discussed, appropriated, 
transformed, etc. Observing the trajectories of cultural 
objects in one’s ﬂow of thinking or discourse reveals much 
about the dia-logicality of mind (Zittoun, 2008, 2010; 
Zittoun, Aveling, Gillespie & Cornish, 2012).
In effect, any reference to another meaning, discourse, 
place, or event, creates the possibility of two perspectives 
in mind: now and then, here and there, me and others, etc.
(Martin & Gillespie, 2010). Hence, the mediation of cul-
tural elements, or the inner dialogues mediated by semi-
otic guidance, generates inner distancing and - the capacity 
to move out of the immediate ﬂow of here-and-now 
experience (Gillespie, 2007; Valsiner, 1998). Inner 
distancing is the condition for recognizing, naming, or 
thinking about a given experience, that is, for sense 
making. In what follows, my suggestion is that such dia-
logical movement can be represented as a loop within a 
three dimensional space.
To support my argument, I will use the diary of a young 
woman as data. Diaries offer the advantage of being “nat-
ural” laboratories in which people externalize their ﬂow of 
thinking-discourse in a verbal form, over a long period of 
time. A diary is dialogical per essence – it is usually 
addressed to someone, and it triggers reﬂexivity through 
language use and writing, which itself transforms and 
elaborates the actual ﬂow of thinking (Gillespie & Zittoun, 
2010; Wagoner et al., 2011; Zittoun & Gillespie, 2012).2 
Beyond these obvious aspects of inherent dialogicality, 
using the presence of cultural elements as beacons, I will 
illustrate three dimensions for organizing inner-
dialogicality.
Hanna’s Diary (1938–1941) (Spencer, 2001) was written 
by an educated young woman during the ﬁrst years of the 
Second World War. Living in Czechoslovakia and from a 
Jewish family, she and her talented German boyfriend 
decided to hide – or rather bracket – their relationship to 
avoid prejudicing his career as a composer. Aged 24, she 
thus started to write a diary for him, containing all the 
thoughts and ideas she could not tell him about, or write to 
him about, in a letter. The diary thus follows her as she 
loses her teacher position because of the racial laws in 
1938, emigrating to the UK as a maid in the spring of 1939, 
and eventually, immigration to Canada in the summer of 
1939, where she reunites with her family on a farm. It ends 
exactly on the day when she meets the Canadian man that 
would become her husband. The diary retraces a portion of 
her life punctuated by important ruptures (mainly the loss 
of civil rights in 1938 and the ﬁrst exile to London), and 
thus renders extremely visible the process of sense making 
in which the person is engaged (Zittoun, 2009). Here I use it 
to illustrate my arguments (which have been built 
empirically through other studies – Zittoun, 2006,
2008).2 Such material also belongs to the public domain and is accessible to 
any interested reader – science can thus remain dialogical.Three dialogical dimensions
A diary can be seen as a complex dialogical object. 
Hanna’s diary is clearly addressed to her ﬁancé [who is 
indicated by “H.” or “you” or is hidden behind “dear 
diary” (Spencer, 2001, note 9, p. 5)]. It has been written in a 
speciﬁc time, and carries the echoes of various social and 
political events. Her moves through three countries and 
many more settings (changes of professional assignments 
in schools around Czechoslovakia, work as a maid in 
various households in England, and as farmer, factory 
worker, touring guest-speaker, and teacher in Canada) are 
re-sponses to war conditions and political decisions 
conspiring to silence her, and that have the power to sub-
stantially limit her freedom of speech and her daily activ-
ities. The others with whom she interacts – family 
members, colleagues, friends – during the war, vary across 
time. For example, after the passing of racial laws in 
November 1938, Hanna not only loses her job, but her 
friends stop seeing her – it is as if she has suddenly lost her 
place in the social world. After her best friend puts an end 
to their friendship, she writes: “For me, it was the last 
contact – the last real contact – with the world around 
me” (Friday, 18 November, Spencer, 2001, p. 54). As a 
cultivated young woman, Hanna reads widely, mentions 
movies and musical pieces that move her, and discusses 
philosophical theories that she ﬁnds interesting. Hence, all 
possible partners of dialogue are present: real others, inner 
alters, cultural objects, diverse situations – all in speciﬁc 
social settings shaped by wider ideological and political 
forces.
Moving away from these aspects, I wish to present three 
dimensions along which Hanna’s inner dialogicality can be 
observed. The three dimensions can be seen as vectors 
organizing the space of her interiority; there are the main 
dimensions, I argue, along which two points, or two per-
spectives, can be parted. They are therefore both the di-
mensions for inner distancing, as well as for inner dialogue
– every inner distance creates an inner loop.3 They are: (1)
Temporal orientation (2) Degrees of generalization; (3) 
Degrees of ﬁction.
1. Temporal orientation
Inner dialogues have an important temporal dimension. 
Temporality is present when a person links today’s situa-
tion A with situation B experienced yesterday, or reﬂects 
about how to solve a problem in the immediate future. It is 
particularly present when people engage in self-narration, 
for instance when people compare self in the present with 
self in the past, or imagine what might happen to them. 
Such oscillation, part of the work of creating one’s own 
continuity through ruptures and change, has also been 
observed by most scholars working on the self. Of course 
this can be expanded to the other forms of dialogue 
mentioned earlier: a dialogue between situations usually 
demands connecting two locations in time.3 These three dimensions have been identiﬁed as they best allow ac-
counting for the diversity of inner loops, both reasoning on the basis of 
data and of theory (see Zittoun et al., 2013).
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4 In a later note, the author indicates that Theodor Fontane was a 
German novelist and that the expression meant “that’s a big 
subject” (Spencer, 2001, p. 183).
5In a diary, dialogues mediated by different tempora
locations are very common. Typically, they are visible when
people refer to special dates (anniversaries, New Year
personal memories), or when they are exposed to the un
known (Zittoun, 2008). Here, I want to emphasize dialogue
through time revealed around the presence of a symboli
resource:
Saturday, 12 November [1938]
It has been a bad week. Night after night I buried mysel
in the pillows as if I could smother all thoughts and
feelings, for there seemed no way out. I felt alone and
desperate. Have been rereading Rilke’s Geschichten vom
lieben Gott [Stories of Our Dear Lord]. Remember how
we used to read stories together? And how you said tha
I would understand them better in life? Well, I think I do
now.
Spencer, 2001, p . 5
In this sequence, Hanna starts reporting her state o
desperation (after her world was turned upside down by
the loss of civil rights): she describes a permanent state o
emotional upheaval with “no way out”. She then report
ﬁnding, as she feels alone, a “non human” other, in the
poems of Rainer Maria Rilke (Rilke, 2003). Starting a dia
logue with them, she creates a distance between a presen
situation (alone and sad) and a past one, in which she wa
happy with her ﬁancé, sharing experiences of reading Rilke
From that bridge to the past, Hanna can also recall the
ﬁancé’s prediction about the future (that she would one
day understand these poems). Eventually, the present be
comes that day announced in the past. Thus, the loop i
completed: from present, to past announcing the present
to now – mediated by the dialogue with the poem (and
behind them the inner alters that are the ﬁancé and
perhaps the poet). Eventually, the present becomes toler
able, as narratively connected to the past – moreover, the
poem is used again in the diary as a companion for the
present (Spencer, 2001, p. 54).
This temporal dimension is a very important aspect o
the dialogicality of mind (Bergson, 1938; James, 1890). I
makes it possible for people to create a sense of their per
sonal continuity through time, and also, to reﬂect upon
change – both being important processes in learning and
development (Erikson, 1959). It is also the condition for an
orientation toward the future, which needs to be anchored
in a present or past in order to become a promoter to
people’s actions. Along the temporal dimension, dialogica
loops can be wider – a young adult can connect to hi
childhood, or think about retirement – or shorter, based on
recent events. Also, depending on their life situations
people can mainly develop either future oriented, or pas
loops (the latter, more typically in old age, or in conﬁned
situations, Zittoun et al., 2013).
2. Degrees of generalization
The second dimension along which uses of resource
can be analyzed, and with them, I suggest, dialogica
movements in the ﬂow of consciousness, corresponds to
progressive generalisation. It is related to the basic functionof semiotic means: to organize thinking in more or les
differentiated and generalized ideas (Valsiner, 2007a
Werner & Kaplan, 1963). Concretely, one looks for wha
the cultural element is attached to. Here are two con
trasting examples:
Friday, 28 October [1938]
[After teaching a philosophy class]. Speaking of good
and evil, forgive the nonsense I wrote last summer, dea
diary, when I was reading Oscar Wilde. Seems to me
now that my concept of good was far too rigid. What i
goodness? There are so many possibilities of doing o
not doing good, kind, decent, appropriate things. But a
Fontane says, “Das ist ein weites Feld, Luise!”.4 I jus
wanted to let you know that I have been thinking abou
it quite a lot lately, prompted by my discussions with
these young people.
Spencer, 2001, p . 4
Monday March 6 [1939], 4:45 pm
[Three days after arrival in England, meeting the lady
she will work for, an impressive matron in a white bed]
I felt like Parsifal, “the dumb knight” on the Mount o
Grail, who was speechless when faced with the sick
Kurneval. The entire atmosphere was eerie. It wa
almost as if there were a veil between me and the world
What a contrast to the hectic times of the last week
(.).
Spencer, 2001, p . 8
These two excerpts have been chosen for their con
trasting uses of symbolic resources on the generalization
dimension.
In the ﬁrst sequence, Hanna mentions Oscar Wilde to
open a reﬂection on general values –Good and Bad; he
current understanding of them has changed. We migh
think that the recent events and experiences have precisely
brought her to revise them, and deﬁne them in such a way
that they can account for her own actions and that of he
close others, as the war deploys. In that sense, the dialogue
takes place at the level of highly generalized experience. I
is probably also related to speciﬁc actions (which could be
seen as more or less contradictory with an ideal o
“goodness”).
The second sequence is anchored in a much more con
crete, situated and embodied experience: Hanna seems to
have had an experience of actual discomfort and stupe
faction. Mobilising Parsifal enables her to take distance and
move out from that experience: the scene seems ﬁrst to
echo and map the whole Gestalt. Mentioning “the dumb
knight” becomes a label to name the initial emotional and
physical state of which Hanna felt prisoner. Thanks to such
naming, she seems to distance herself enough from the
situation to establish a dialogue with it, linking and
comparing it to other situations (“last weeks’”).
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6Altogether, such distancing thus moves along a con-
tinuum, going from the recognition of certain patterns of
experience, their naming, the deﬁnition of progressive
categories, up to general values. This dimension thus en-
ables us to reﬂect in categorical, quasi-conceptual or
conceptual terms, in terms of general values as well as over-
generalized impressions (Green, 1999; Valsiner, 2007a;
Vygotsky, 1986). As such, it generates dialogical dynamics
between two positions on such a continuum, and can
substantially transform the degree of general-ization at
which an experience or an event is appre-hended; it might
thus contribute to the person’s f u r t h e r  change.
3. Degrees of ﬁction
A third dimension concerns the dialogue that takes 
place between “real” events or experiences, and imaginary 
and ﬁctional ones. Here, the loops move along the dimen-
sion that unites “what is” and “what could be”, the real and 
the hypothetical, or the unreal (Josephs & Valsiner, 1998; 
Valsiner, 2007a). Such aspects are marked in the discourse 
by formula such as “what if”, by conditional or subjunctive 
forms, or by semantic ﬁelds suggesting brack-eting the real, 
or opening ﬁction, dream, etc. Here, for instance, is 
Hanna’s r e ﬂection after seeing a Disney movie, Snow 
White and the Seven Dwarfs (Cottrell & Hand, 1938):
Thursday, 24 November [1938]
It’s fabulous, magical. I am still quite numb. If you saw it
– and I hope you will – you would go straight to Walt
Disney and offer to work with him. And I could join you. 
Or another version of the dream, as I continued it: I am 
standing in a big ofﬁce, talking to Walt. And one day 
soon afterwards someone in old Europe gets a letter 
from America with an invitation.Now I am not scared 
of America any longer. It’s so wonderful how everything 
in the ﬁlm comes to life. The trees, the stones, the 
animals.
Spencer, 2001, p.56
Here Hanna seems to have had a wonderful experience 
in the Disney world with dancing and singing animals – a 
ﬁctional, cultural experience. Coming back to real life, she 
starts to “dream” that her ﬁancé would go to the USA, or 
that she would ﬁrst meet Walt Disney. The “dream” has 
variations, Hanna plays with possible imaginary scenarios, 
nourished with real life experiences (e.g., of “big ofﬁces”).past
general
Here and now
Fig. 1. Three-dimensionsThis sequence enables her to move through at least three 
different degrees of ﬁction: the here-and-now difﬁcult 
situation, the totally unreal world in which brooms sing 
and dance (the ﬁctional sphere), and the unlikely-real 
sphere in which she might meet M. Disney himself. This 
dialogue between here-and-now and various hypothetical 
positions also creates a loop that ends up back in the pre-
sent: now, she is “not scared of America any longer”. This 
last point has very concrete implications, as one quite 
reasonable option for Hanna and her family is to migrate to 
America. Here again, the dialogical loop has the possibility 
to change the here-and-now.
The importance of these dialogues with what is not or 
what could be, have been identiﬁed previously by Vygotsky 
around the idea of the zone of proximal development 
(Vygotsky, 1986). It also plays some role in clinical work, 
and in studies of scientiﬁc ( Vaihinger, 1924) and cultural 
creativity (Glaveanu, 2010). Here, I propose to see this 
progressive ﬁctionalisation of experience as the work of 
imagination, rather than seeing it as an escapist aspect of 
daily thinking, I suggest that it can offer the person a whole 
new range of perspectives to support dialogical move-
ments. Imagination is thus an essential component of mind 
(Pelaprat & Cole, 2011; Zittoun et al., 2013).A three dimensional dialogical space
These three dimensions are not mutually exclusive; 
they are always potentially present. Inner dialogical 
movements can be represented as taking place in a three-
dimensional space, around an origin deﬁned by the here-
and-now (see Fig. 1). If the intersection of these dimensions 
represents the here-and-now, then any dialogical 
movement is generated when the person moves away, 
through semiotic mediation, in one or the other direction. 
This means that any dialogical movement demands a 
displacement that can be located in regard to all three 
dimensions.
If we examine the Walt Disney example again, Hanna 
actually moves away from the here-and-now situation (a 
difﬁcult day in time of war) into ﬁction, where she 
eventually imagines an impossible scenario (talking toWalt 
Disney). She also thinks about the future (going to 
America), and goes back in the past when she imagines the 
presence and work of her ﬁancé, who she has not seen now 
for quite a while. Finally, through her exposure to 
speciﬁc i m a g e s – singing brooms, poetic birds – she 
actually develops a general positive feeling about America, 
as a land of promises and possibilities. In Fig.1 the grey line 
attempts to represent this movement.
future
irreal
of dialogical space.
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7In other words, a deeper understanding of dialogicality
as a fundamental process invites us to consider dialogica
movements in the mind, and in the ﬂow of thinking and
discourse. This goes beyond the presence of other person
in one’s discourse – here for instance the ﬁancé and Wal
Disney –to examine dialogical movement as enabled by a
wider range of semiotic mediations. My proposition is to
consider the dialogical positions generated as a person
moves through time, and through levels of ﬁctionalization
and generalization. Each of these dimensions creates a
distance from the here-and-now, and as such, a dialogica
tension. From this tension, the person’s ﬂow of conscious
ness usually loops and comes enriched back to the present.
If dialogicality is a proper condition of the mind – of the
person in her social and cultural environment – then it i
important to see what supports such dialogicality. The ﬁne
grained analysis proposed here suggests a variety of dia
logical movements, which seem to nourish a person’s ca
pacity for reinventing herself. Conversely, limits to a
person’s inner dialogue and capacity to change might be
due to the presence of oppressing real or imaginary others
to restraints on one’s capacity to establish a connexion
between present and past, or to the difﬁculty one migh
have in jumping into the unreal or the imaginary. 
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e Dialogicality, answerability, and the emergence of the 
person
The dialogical perspective proposed here raises many
issues. If so many others enter in the making of the self
how can a person have an idea that is his or her own? How
can one free oneself from the louder or more powerfu
voices of others – as suggested by the case of Hanna?
For inner dialogical movements not to be imposed
or hindered, something in the person needs to be
preserved: there is a fundamental human need for privacy
integrity and uniqueness, or “faithfulness to
oneself” (Cresswell, 2011). This is where the ethica
stance underlying dialogical approaches, often left aside by
current research, can be recalled.
The possibility of dialogicality demands the basi
acknowledgement by others of the person in his or he
uniqueness, with rights to think, feel and act as a ful
member of the social world – an ethical claim also sup
ported by developmental as well as clinical psychology.5
Inner dialogicality thus depends, on the one side, on rea
dialogues with social others. The experience of being
acknowledged and recognized by others is a precondition
for the development of inner thinking. Such acknowl
edgement thus grounds the capacity to stand for onesel
while committing oneself in close relationships, learning
situations, at work or in the public space. On the other side
dialogicality precisely requires the inner phase of inne
dialogues – the possibility to let one’s thinking wander
exploring dialogical spaces (Zittoun, 2012). Such explora
tions demand time and intimacy, internal freedom and a-
e 
5 As Hanna rightly feels, the progressive loss of professions, friends, 
public spaces or cultural events, imposed by the Nazi regime, turns Jews 
into “outcasts”, and raises questions about how one might “keep one’s 
self-respect” (Spencer, 2001, p. 52).relative security – the space to deploy an interiority. A diary
can provide the conditions for “thinking spaces” (Perret
Clermont, 2004). Overbearing others, demanding socia
duties, restrictions on time, and in more extreme situa
tions, deprivation or abuse, threaten the possibility to
maintain and nourish inner dialogicality.
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